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Abstract. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) can be considered an
approach to public-key cryptography based on the arithmetic of elliptic
curves and the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP).
Regarding encryption, the best-known scheme based on ECC is the Ellip-
tic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES), included in standards
from ANSI, IEEE, and also ISO/IEC. In the present work, we provide
a comparison of two Java Card implementations of ECIES that we have
developed using prime and binary fields, respectively.
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1 Introduction
In the current world, cryptography is essential for the protection of data and
communication systems. Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman sparked off a rev-
olution when they introduced the concept of public-key cryptography in 1976.
Since that year, a great number of cryptosystems have been proposed, though
many have been proved to be unsuitable for commercial purposes due to vulner-
abilities in their designs or to their high complexity. The best-known successful
public-key cryptosystem is RSA [1, 2], which was the first algorithm known to
be suitable for signing as well as encrypting data.
In 1985, Victor Miller [3] and Neil Koblitz [4] independently suggested the
usage of elliptic curves defined over finite fields in cryptography [5]. In compar-
ison with other public-key cryptosystems, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
uses significantly shorter keys. The reason for this fact is related to the hardness
of the ECDLP, which is considered to be more difficult to solve than the Integer
Factorization Problem (IFP) used by RSA or the Discrete Logarithm Problem
(DLP) which is the basis of the ElGamal encryption scheme [6].
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Smart cards are small, portable, tamper-resistant devices offering users con-
venient storage and processing capabilities, and as such they play a prominent
role in providing the required security level in banking transactions, the GSM
and UMTS cellular systems or pay TV environments, to put only a few ex-
amples. Smart cards are amenable to cryptographic implementations, as they
contain multiple software and hardware countermeasures designed to protect
sensible information such as the keying material [7].
The two most widely used smart card platforms are Java Card [8], developed
by Sun with the support from several leading smart card providers during the
1990s, and MULTOS (a multi-application operating system controlled by the
MULTOS Consortium) [9]. Though both platforms implement cryptographic
capabilities, the public-key cryptography capabilities provided by Java Card are
more complete, specially regarding ECC functionality.
In the present work, we describe two implementations, using prime and binary
fields, of the best known encryption scheme using elliptic curves, the Elliptic
Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES). To our knowledge, there are no
smart card implementations of this encryption scheme, so this is the first time
that ECIES is implemented, and its performance is analysed, in Java Cards. We
also provide a performance comparison of both implementations using different
combinations of plaintext lengths and key sizes.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a brief introduction to
ECC and ECIES. Section 3 includes a summary of the ECIES support in Java
Card. Section 4 provides the main characteristics of the smart cards used in the
tests and offers some details about the applet development phase. Finally, in
Section 5 we present the experimental results of the tests along with the most
important findings and conclusions.
2 Elliptic Curve Cryptography and ECIES
An elliptic curve E defined over a finite field F is a plane non-singular cubic
curve with at least a rational point [10]. In practice, generic elliptic curves are
managed using the following equation, known as the Weierstrass equation in
non-homogeneous form [11], where the elements a1, a2, a3, a4, a6 ∈ F and ∆ 6= 0,
being ∆ the discriminant of the curve E [12]:
E : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6. (1)
The homogeneous version of the Weierstrass equation implies the existence
of a special point, called the point at infinity, which is denoted as O and does
not have a counterpart in the affine plane.
When working with finite fields, it is possible to obtain simplified versions of
the Weierstrass equation. If the finite field is a prime field, i.e. F = Fp, where
p > 3 is a prime number, the equation defining the elliptic curve becomes:
y2 = x3 + ax+ b. (2)
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On the other hand, if the finite field is a binary field, i.e. F = F2m , where m
is a positive integer number, then the equation of the elliptic curve is:
y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b. (3)
Typical applications in security are key exchange, digital signatures and data
encryption. For those three applications, there are lots of standards, some of
them implemented through ECC. The best known ECC schemes and protocols
are the Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH), a key agreement protocol [3, 4];
the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), equivalent to the DSA
algorithm [13]; and the Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme, the most
extended ECC encryption scheme, defined in ANSI X9.63 [14], IEEE 1363a [15],
and ISO/IEC 18033-2 [16].
As its name properly indicates, ECIES is an integrated encryption scheme
which uses the following functions:
– Key Agreement (KA): Function used for the generation of a shared secret
by two parties.
– Key Derivation Function (KDF): Mechanism that produces a set of keys
from keying material and some optional parameters.
– Encryption (ENC): Symmetric encryption algorithm.
– Message Authentication Code (MAC): The output of the MAC function is
the data used to authenticate a message.
– Hash (HASH): Digest function, used within the KDF and the MAC function.
3 ECIES support in Java Card
Java Card is a framework for programming and executing applications in smart
cards developed by Sun and several smart card providers. Java Card version 2.1
already presented some cryptographic capabilities (e.g. DES, RSA, SHA-1, etc.),
but the support for ECC was not included until version 2.2.
Even though ECDH and ECDSA are available in several versions of Java
Card, and thus a programmer can use both ECC schemes by calling the proper
methods of the Java Card API, this is not the case for ECIES. In fact, not only
ECIES is not directly implemented as a single primitive in Java Card, but some
of the functionality needed (e.g. the KDF and some MAC functions) must be
developed by the programmer. To our knowledge, no ECIES implementation has
been developed in Java Card prior to ours.
Java Card 2.2.1 implements the following functionality related to ECIES:
– KA function: Both Diffie-Hellman (DH) and the related Diffie-Hellman with
cofactor (DHC), with the peculiarity that, instead of the product of the
sender’s ephemeral private key and the recipient’s public key, both functions
provide the SHA-1 output of that result.
– ENC function: AES with key length 128, 192, and 256 bits in modes CBC
and ECB (in both cases without padding).
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– HASH function: SHA-1.
– ECC key length: 113, 131, 163, and 193 bits in binary fields, and 112, 128,
160, and 192 bits in prime fields.
In comparison to the previous version, Java Card 2.2.2 included new MAC
and hash functions. More precisely, in this version programmers were able to use
the following functions that were not previously available: SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512, HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-
512.
4 Smart cards used in the tests and applet development
The smart card models used in the tests presented in this contribution, namely
JCOP 41 and JCOP J3A, have been kindly provided by NXP Semiconductors.
All the information presented in this section is publicly available at the NXP
web site [17–19].
Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of JCOP 41 [17, 18] and JCOP
J3A cards [17, 19]:
Table 1. JCOP 41 and JCOP J3A features
JCOP 41 JCOP J3A
Hardware module P5CT072 P5CD080
CPU Secure MX51 Secure MX51
Operating system JCOP 2.2.1 JCOP 2.4.1
Java Card version 2.2.1 2.2.2
GlobalPlatform version 2.1.1 2.1.1
ROM 160 Kbytes 200 Kbytes
EEPROM 72 Kbytes 80 Kbytes
RAM 4608 bytes 6144 bytes
Cryptographic coprocessors 3DES and PKI 3DES, AES, and PKI
It must be clarified at this point that the JCOP 41 product implements ECC
for curves defined over F2m , while the JCOP J3A model allows to use elliptic
curves defined over Fp. This is the reason why the available key sizes are not
the same in those cards (131, 163, and 193 bits in JCOP 41 cards, and 128, 160,
and 192 in JCOP J3A cards). For comparison purposes, in practice we will treat
keys of similar lengths as if they were of the same size, as the difference in bits
is not significant (131 vs 128, 163 vs 160, and 193 vs 192).
The applets for the JCOP 41 and JCOP J3A products have been developed
by us using the Eclipse software (version 3.2) and the JCOP Tools plug-in for
Eclipse kindly provided by NXP Semiconductors. This plug-in allows to easily
compile, download and install Java Card applets in the JCOP smart cards.
With the goal of producing a valid comparison, we decided to implement the
same ECIES functionality in both platforms, with the sole exception of the finite
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fields and the key lengths used (binary finite fields with key lengths of 131, 163,
and 193 bits in JCOP 41 cards, and prime finite fields with key lengths of 128,
160, and 192 in JCOP J3A cards).
The most important common features of the applets for both platforms are
the following:
– KA function: DH, where the output of the function is the SHA-1 value of
the shared secret.
– KDF function: KDF1 [16].
– ENC algorithm: 3DES with two keys, in CBC mode, and without padding.
– MAC function: HMAC-SHA-1 [20].
– HASH function: SHA-1.
As the maximum length for the APDUs transmitted to and from the smart
cards using the T=0 protocol is 255 bytes [21], the plaintexts managed in the
tests performed in this contribution have a maximum size of 160 bytes, so both
the cryptogram provided by the smart card during the encryption process and
the cryptogram sent to the smart card in the decryption process can be inserted
in a single APDU.
The application code size in EEPROM is 4940 bytes for the JCOP 41 card
and 4328 bytes in the case of the JCOP J3A card, as informed by Eclipse. The
reason for this difference is that the JCOP 41 implementation manages keys of
4 possible sizes (113, 131, 163, and 193 bits) whilst the JCOP J3A manages
only three types of keys (128, 160, and 192 bits). Regarding the keys of 113
bits available at the JCOP 41 cards, though implemented, we decided not to
use them in this comparison, as that key size does not have a counterpart of a
similar length in the JCOP J3A model.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the elliptic curves implemented by the
JCOP cards are standard curves published by SECG (sect131r1, sect193r1,
secp128r1, and secp160r1), WAP Forum (c2pnb163v1), and ANSI (P-192).
5 Experimental results and conclusions
In order to be able to measure the encryption and decryption time, we developed
a Java application using the Java Smartcard I/O API [22], available since Java
SE 6, and the System.nanoTime()method included in that API, which returns
the current value in nanoseconds of the most precise available system timer.
Using that timing function, the starting time has been taken exactly before
sending the command APDU with the encryption/decryption request to the
smart card, while the finishing time for each measurement has been obtained just
after receiving the response APDU with the output of the encryption/decryption
process from the smart card.
All the tests have been performed 20 times for each combination of message
length (64, 96, 128, and 160 bytes) and key length (131, 163, and 193 bits when
using the prime curves of JCOP 41, and 128, 160, and 192 bits in the case of
the prime curves included in JCOP J3A).
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The data included in Table 2 show the mean value of the 20 tests performed
for every encryption and decryption combination in JCOP 41 and JCOP J3A
cards. Taking into account all the tests, the maximum standard deviation com-
puted is 0.81 milliseconds, which provides useful information about the stability
of the smart card performance. Due to this stability, we decided that it was not
necessary to perform additional tests, as the measures taken are concentrated
around each average value and the CV in the worst-case scenario is 0.00286.
The results depend on the Java Card applet and the particular software
optimizations applied (size of the arrays, variable usage and sharing, etc.), which
means that a different applet could produce different values.
Table 2. JCOP 41 encryption and decryption time in milliseconds
Encryption Decryption
Message length (bytes) Message length (bytes)
64 96 128 160 64 96 128 160
Key 131 433.79 463.97 498.25 531.29 279.02 280.32 296.01 297.87
JCOP 41 length 163 461.07 491.89 525.60 554.59 291.71 293.15 309.11 310.76
(bits) 193 499.28 529.95 563.75 593.98 311.19 313.08 328.78 331.00
Key 128 489.58 498.19 517.37 520.19 436.72 439.72 453.35 455.42
JCOP J3A length 160 532.51 535.03 549.06 551.17 459.89 462.83 476.58 479.01
(bits) 192 597.85 601.28 615.44 617.52 523.09 525.75 539.93 542.82
Figures 1 and 2 present the performance of JCOP 41 and JCOP J3A when
encrypting and decrypting messages of 64 and 160 bytes, respectively. Those
figures include the processing results for key lengths of 131, 163, and 193 bits
(JCOP 41), and 128, 160, and 192 bits (JCOP J3A).
After reviewing the data, it can be stated that the encryption time is rel-
atively similar in JCOP 41 and JCOP J3A cards. However, it seems that the
JCOP J3A implementation is more sensible to an increase in the key size than
the JCOP 41 applet when maintaining the length of the plaintext.
Observing the decryption time, it is clear that there is an important gap
(approximately 150-200 milliseconds, depending on the key length and message
size) regarding the decryption process in both smart cards. Given that the applet
functionality is basically the same (all the variables are located in RAM, the
arrays have the same length in all the cases, etc.) this difference can be only
explained due to a difference in the DES cryptoprocessor used in those models
or to the countermeasures put in place in each card to protect them against side
channel attacks.
In both smart cards, the decryption process is faster than the encryption
procedure, basically because in the encryption process there is one step (the
generation of the ephemeral key pair) which is not performed during the decryp-
tion process.
The quite noticeable increase in the encryption processing time for the JCOP
41 cards can be also visualized in Figure 1, where it can be seen how the en-
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Fig. 1. Processing time in JCOP 41 and JCOP J3A for messages of 64 bytes.
Fig. 2. Processing time in JCOP 41 and JCOP J3A for messages of 160 bytes.
cryption time gap existing between JCOP 41 and JCOP J3A almost dissapears
when passing from plaintexts of 64 bytes to clear messages of 160 bytes. This
result suggests that, when encrypting plaintexts of more than 160 bytes, JCOP
41 cards will be slower than the JCOP J3A model using the same configuration.
Another consequence of the increase in the relative difference of the encryp-
tion and decryption time in the JCOP 41 cards is that, when encrypting messages
of 160 bytes, the time needed to encrypt the plaintext nearly doubles the time
needed to decrypt the cryptogram.
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